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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTH COLONIE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT/AFT/NEA/AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NQrU-27717 
NORTH COLONIE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
CATHERINE G. SCAVO, NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, 
for Charging Party 
DAVID W. MORRIS, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the North Colonie Teachers 
Association, NYSUT/AFT/NEA/AFL-CIO (Association) to a decision by an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing a charge filed by the Association alleging that the North 
Colonie Central School District (District) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when the District adopted a school calendar for the 2007-08 
school year requiring Association bargaining unit members to work 188 days. The ALJ 
concluded that the Association had failed to demonstrate that the District had changed 
an unequivocal past practice. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Association asserts that the ALJ made a number of 
interpretative errors of fact and errors of law in concluding that the Association had failed 
to prove an unequivocal District past practice. The District supports the ALJ's decision. 
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Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The 2003-07 agreement (agreement) between the District and the Association 
does not define the length of the District's instructional school year or the specific 
number of work days for bargaining unit members each school year. 
The consistent long-term practice in the District is for the Association bargaining 
unit's school year to commence in September, on the Tuesday immediately following 
Labor Day, and end on the Regents rating day, when Regents testing concludes. During 
prior negotiations in the late 1990s, the District initially proposed and then withdrew a 
negotiation demand to extend the bargaining unit's 1998-99 school year by two days 
either before Labor Day or after the Regents rating day. 
Each year,- the District develops a school calendar for the following year after it has 
received the regional school year calendar approved by BOCES. The annual BOCES 
regional school calendar identifies, for the following year, instructional days, staff 
development days, holidays, as well as, periods for a December recess, a winter recess and 
a spring recess. The annual District school calendar contains a similar breakdown of 
information but not necessarily the same instructional days, staff development days, 
holidays and recess periods as the BOCES regional calendar. 
.....According, to District Assistant Superintendent Joseph Corr (Corr), the BOCES 
calendar is utilized as a guide by all BOCES component districts. He explained that the 
number of bargaining unit work days in the District for a particular school year is 
impacted by objective factors such as the days of the week that holidays fall on, the 
length of the December recess and the date set for Regents rating day. He noted that 
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other Districts, in contrast, have negotiated language in agreements that set a specific 
number of work days for each school year. 
Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the Association is provided with an opportunity 
to comment on the following year's school calendar while it is being developed by the 
District. Article XXVI, §G of the agreement states: 
In developing the annual school calendar, the Superintendent 
shaH-submiHhe-annual-calendartothe Executive-Committee 
of the Association, through the President, prior to 
February 15. The Association shall have the right to make 
recommendations to the Superintendent by March 1 for 
consideration in the finalizing of the calendar. 
As part of the parties' practice under the agreement, after the Association 
receives a proposed calendar from the District, the Association will either respond 
affirmatively or make suggestions aimed at improving the calendar. Following such 
input, the Association receives notification of the final calendar only after it has been 
approved by the Board of Education (Board).1 
During the hearing, the parties stipulated to the admission of annual District 
school calendars for the 1963-64 through 2006-07 school years which set forth the 
number of work days in each year starting with the day after Labor Day and ending with 
the Regents rating day in late June.2 From year to year, the actual start and end date for 
the school year, as well as the number of work days, vary depending on the day of the 
week that Labor Day and Regents rating day fall. In addition, the number of work days 
1
 Although we construe the District's fourth affirmative defense as constituting a duty 
satisfaction defense to the charge, we are constrained by our Rules of Procedure 
(Rules), §213.2(b)(4) from ruling on that defense because of the failure of the District to 
file a cross-exception to the ALJ's ruling that the District had waived the defense. 41 
PERB 1J4550, note 3 (2008). See, Town ofOrangetown, 40 PERB P008 (2007). 
2
 The joint exhibit does not include calendars for two school years: 1966-67 and 1983-84. 
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varies from year to year based on the number of days within each calendar month as 
well as the days when Christmas and New Years fall. 
According to the school calendars in evidence, from 1963-64 through 2006-07 
school years, the number of work days, including staff development days, has been 
between 184 and 187: three school years had 184 work days, 23 school years3 had 185 
work days, 14 school years had 186 work days and two school years had 187 work 
days. In each school year prior to 1995-96, the District scheduled three, rather than 
four, staff development days. 
The 2007-08 BOCES regional school calendar includes 188 work days including 
three staff development days. In March 2007, Assistant Superintendent Corr informed 
Association President Rodney Wheeler of the District's intention to propose to the 
Board, for its approval, a 2007-08 calendar containing 188 work days with four days set 
) aside for staff development. The Association objected to the proposed calendar and 
suggested that the number of work days be reduced to 185 or 186 work days. 
Following the Board's approval of the proposed 2007-08 calendar, the 
Association filed a grievance asserting that the calendar violates a 40-year past practice 
of the District adopting calendars with 185 or 186 work days. The grievance was later 
withdrawn prior to the filing of the present charge.4 
3
 In 2000-01, grades 7-12 had 186 work days while grades K-6 had 185 work days. 
4
 The record contains factual assertions by both parties at variance with the information 
gleaned from the school calendars in evidence. In a letter denying the Association's 
grievance challenging the 2007-08 calendar, Superintendent of Schools Randy A. 
Ehrenberg stated that over the past four decades, the District had four school years with 
184 work days, 21 school years with 185 work days, 16 school years with 186 work days 
and two school years with 187 work days. In challenging the denial of the grievance, 
however, the Association argued before the Board of Education that during the prior 40 
years there were five school years with 184 work days, 20 school years with 185 work 
days, 14 school years with 186 work days and 3 school years with 187 work days. 
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DISCUSSION 
In its exceptions, the Association contends the ALJ erred in concluding that the 
Association had failed to prove an unequivocal 40-year past practice that was 
unilaterally changed by the District in 2007-08 with respect to the number of work days 
for bargaining unit members. According to the Association, in 41 out of the 43 school 
years, prior to 2007-08, the number of work days was less than 186. 
It is well-established that an expansion of a school year to include additional work 
days for a bargaining unit constitutes a mandatory subject of negotiations under the 
Act.5 At the same time, a charging party has the burden of proof to establish an 
enforceable past practice in an improper practice charge alleging a unilateral change in 
the number of work days within a school year.6 
Under the applicable test for an enforceable past practice, restated in Chenango 
Forks Central School District7 (hereinafter Chenango Forks), a charging party has the 
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case showing that the "practice was 
unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a period of time under the 
circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the affected unit employees 
that the [practice] would continue."8 In addition, in Chenango Forks we emphasized that 
the facts and circumstances of each case must be examined to determine whether an 
enforceable past practice has been established. 
5
 City Sch Dist ofJhe City of Oswego, New York, 5 PERB..p011.(1972), confirmed, sub.... 
nom., City Sch Dist of the City of Oswego, New York v Helsby, 42 AD2d 262, 6 PERB 
1J7008 (3d Dept 1973); Addison Cent Sch Dist, 17 PERB 1J3076 (1984); see also, Vil of 
Mamaroneck PBA, 22 PERB 1J3029 (1989). 
6
 Beacon City Sch Dist, 17 PERB 1J3094 (1984) affg, 17 PERB H4561 (1984). 
7
 40 PERB 1J3012 (2007). 
8
 Quoting County of Nassau, 24 PERB 1J3029 at 3058 (1991). 
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Based on the facts in the present case, we conclude that the Association fails to 
establish an unequivocal past practice that creates a reasonable expectation by 
bargaining unit employees with respect to a maximum number of work days in each 
school year that the District unilaterally changed. Rather, the evidence demonstrates a 
District past practice of applying a consistent methodology for determining the number of 
work days in each school year which it utilized for the 2007-08 school year calendar. 
First, the Association's argument that, under the past practice, bargaining unit 
members have worked less than 186 work days in 41 out of 43 school years is directly 
contradicted by the school calendars in evidence.9 The District calendars establish that 
in at least 16 school years during the four decade period relied upon by the Association, 
bargaining unit members worked 186 or 187 days.10 
In addition, although the record does establish an unequivocal practice of the 
District commencing the school year on the Tuesday following Labor Day and ending it on 
Regents rating day in June, it does not establish a similar unequivocal practice limiting or 
setting a particular number of work days within each school year.11 instead, the record 
demonstrates that the Association did not rebut the District's evidence establishing that 
the District applies consistent objective factors that result in a fluctuation in the respective 
number of work days that are set forth in the District calendars in evidence. These 
9
 Second Exception; Memorandum on Behalf of Association, p. 5. 
10
 The Association's claim is further contradicted by its earlier contention, in support of 
its grievance, that in three prior school years there were 187 work days. 
11
 State law does set a statutory minimum number of instructional days for each school 
district. Pursuant to Educ Law §3204(4), a full time day school must be in session for 
instructional purposes for not less than 190 days each year inclusive of legal holidays. 
In general, Educ Law §3604(7) requires a District, in order to be eligible for State 
financial aid, to demonstrate that in the preceding school year it provided 180 days of 
instruction. 
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objective factors are annual variables that are linked to the general calendar year 
including the number of work days in each calendar month as well as the days of the week 
when certain holidays fall. The number of work days listed in each school calendar is also 
controlled by the date set for the Regents rating day in June. 
Finally, the Association's reliance on an ALJ's decision in Town of Webb Union 
Free School District12 (hereinafter Town of Webb) is misplaced. The mere fact that an 
enforceable past practice was established in Town of Webb, with respect to the number 
of instructional days in a school year, does not demonstrate that the facts and 
circumstances in the present case are sufficient to establish an enforceable practice 
regarding the number of work days in a school year. 
WE, THEREFORE, ORDER that the improper practice charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: November 26, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
12 25 PERB H4548(1992). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DUTCHESS UNITED EDUCATORS, 
Charging Party, 
CASENOS. U-27107 
- and - & U-27371 
DUTCHESS COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Respondent. 
JOSEPH P. CAREY, P.C. (JOSEPH P. CAREY of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
ROEMER WALLENS & MINEAUX LLP (WILLIAM M. WALLENS of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to the Board on exceptions filed by the Dutchess United 
Educators (DUE) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing two 
improper practice charges filed by DUE against Dutchess Community College (College). 
The first charge alleges that the College violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to negotiate, upon a demand, the impact of an 
academic assessment plan, and by engaging in conduct that DUE claims constitutes 
improper direct dealing with its bargaining unit members. In the second charge, DUE 
alleges that the College violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (d) of the Act by engaging in direct 
dealing through other communications with bargaining unit members. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, DUE challenges the ALJ's decision to dismiss its direct dealing 
claim on both procedural and substantive grounds. DUE asserts the ALJ lacks authority, 
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under the Rules of Procedure (Rules), to dismiss a charge for failing to state a violation 
under the Act, following the initial review by the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director). It also challenges the ALJ's dismissal of its direct dealing 
claim on the grounds that the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standard and deprived it 
of procedural due process. In addition, it asserts that the ALJ erred by limiting the hearing 
and~excluding-evidence--because ^ ^ 
its direct dealing claim. 
DUE excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that the charges did not include a claim that 
the College engaged in bad faith impact negotiations as well as the ALJ's exclusion of 
evidence in support of that claim. 
Finally, DUE excepts to the ALJ's dismissal of its claim that the College refused to 
engage in impact negotiations following a demand to do so. It also challenges various 
factual and legal conclusions reached by the ALJ in dismissing the claim. 
The College supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the exceptions and the 
response, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the charges. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In order to determine DUE's exceptions, we begin with a review of the pre-
hearing processing of the improper practice charges. 
On October 26, 2006, DUE filed an amended improper practice charge 
(U-27107) supplementing the allegations contained in its original charge alleging that 
the College violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. Following the filing, DUE received a pre-
conference notification, dated November 2, 2006, stating that the Director had 
concluded that the sole claim in the amended charge is the College's alleged failure to 
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negotiate impact upon a demand in violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. However, DUE 
was granted the opportunity to clarify whether the amended charge was intended to 
include any other claims. In addition, DUE was requested to identify the allegations in 
the amended charge that stated a violation of the Act which occurred within four months 
of the original charge being filed. 
In^response^DUEiihrough-counselradvised the-assigned-Atd-thatihe^amended-
charge was intended to allege both a failure by the College to negotiate impact along 
with a claim that the College violated the Act by negotiating directly with individual 
bargaining unit members. In support of both claims, DUE referenced the allegations 
contained in five specific paragraphs of the amended charge. 
Following a second pre-conference request by the ALJ for clarification, DUE 
submitted a letter, dated December 11, 2006, that again referenced the same five 
paragraphs, along with the content of certain exhibits attached to the amended charge, 
as stating a claim for direct dealing. The referenced paragraphs allege that the College 
has engaged in various communications with DUE bargaining unit members. With 
respect to its claim that the College failed to engage in impact negotiations, DUE 
referenced allegations contained in other paragraphs of the amended charge, as well 
as other exhibits, as supporting that claim. 
On February 8, 2007, DUE filed a second charge (U-27371) which it later 
acknowledged was intended to be a further amendment to U-27107. The new charge, 
U-27371, alleges that the College violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (d) of the Act by engaging 
certain other alleged communications with bargaining unit members. 
Following a pre-hearing conference, the ALJ sent a letter, dated July 26, 2007, to 
the parties confirming the status of both charges. The letter stated that U-27107 would 
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be processed only as stating a claim for the College's alleged failure to negotiate 
impact. In the letter, the ALJ stated that DUE's allegations are insufficient to state an 
independent violation of the Act for direct dealing. With respect to U-27371, the ALJ 
stated that the new charge both repeated and supplemented DUE's allegations of direct 
dealing contained in U-27107 and was equally deficient because it failed to allege 
sufficientfactsio-state-axlaim: 
DUE submitted a responsive letter, dated August 6, 2007, objecting to portions 
of the ALJ's letter of confirmation. In its letter, DUE asserted that U-27107 should be 
further processed as alleging claims for both a failure to negotiate impact and direct 
dealing. Moreover, DUE asserted that U-27371, as an amendment to U-27107, alleges 
both claims as well. With respect to the pleading deficiencies identified by the ALJ 
regarding the direct dealing claim, DUE contended that it should be granted the 
opportunity to present evidence on that claim at a hearing. 
Following reassignment of the charges by the Director, the ALJ assigned to 
conduct the hearing notified the parties in writing that the charges would be 
consolidated for a hearing on the allegation that the College failed to negotiate impact. 
In her letter, the ALJ reaffirmed that DUE's charges are insufficient to state a claim for 
direct dealing. 
At the commencement of the hearing, the ALJ ruled that the hearing would be 
limited to the issue of whether the College violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by failing to 
negotiate impact upon demand. With respect to DUE's direct dealing claim, the ALJ 
concluded that even if DUE proved the facts as alleged in the pleadings and 
correspondence, it would be insufficjent to establish a violation of the Act. Furthermore, 
the ALJ sustained evidentiary objections by the College by excluding evidence DUE 
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,^~\ sought to introduce with respect to the College's actions during and after two impact 
negotiation sessions held in November and December 2006. 
FACTS 
Following an April 2005 accreditation review by the Commission on Higher 
Education of the Middle States Association, the College was mandated to establish, by 
ApriM720077an_academic~assessmB^^^^ 
campus. Consistent with that mandate, in February 2006, the Professional Staff 
Organization (PSO) established an Ad Hoc Assessment Committee (Committee) with the 
responsibility of recommending to PSO, prior to its next meeting in fall 2006, a 
framework for the College to conduct such an assessment. The PSO is the College's 
campus governance organization which is comprised of College administrators, including 
College President Dr. D. David Conklin (Dr. Conklin), along with chairpersons, faculty 
members and other staff, some whom are in the DUE bargaining unit. 
Prior to September 2006, the Committee prepared and circulated a draft report 
proposing a three-year transitional academic assessment plan ending in fall 2009. 
Dr. Joseph Norton (Dr. Norton) is the president of DUE and has held that position 
for over 11 years. On August 24, 2006, Dr. Conklin sent Dr. Norton an e-mail stating that 
College Dean of Academic Affairs Carl Denti (Dean Denti) would be willing to meet with 
Dr. Norton and DUE Treasurer Johanna Halsey (Halsey) to discuss how to successfully 
implement an academic assessment plan. On September 5, 2006, Dr. Norton e-mailed 
j 
Dean Denti requesting such a meeting, and the meeting took place three days later. On 
September 12, 2006, Dr. Norton sent an e-mail to Dean Denti, Dr. Conklin and others 
objecting to what transpired at the meeting. In his e-mail, Dr. Norton stated: 
The President of DCC was formally notified in two letters 
that DUE wanted to negotiate contractual issues which DUE 
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believes are inherent in the work laid out in the draft of the 
Academic Assessment Plan - specifically in the areas of 
commencement and allocation of resources to DUE 
members. The President directed us to your office to 
discuss these issues. We came to that meeting as 
representatives of DUE and were therefore surprised when 
you repeated several times that you were not acting as the 
authorized representative of the College.1 (Emphasis 
added) 
Irradditiun; DrrNorto ^ reiterated DUE's~positiun~ttTat: 
the latest draft of the Academic Assessment Plan 
demonstrates DUE's position that a significant amount of 
new work is being proposed. Therefore, there are 
contractual implications that must be resolved by the College 
and DUE. Many our concerns are similar to the ones we 
raised last February and March 2006 which the College said 
we would negotiate. We withdrew our improper practice [sic] 
because the College resumed discussion and negotiation. 
(Emphasis added) 
Furthermore, Dr. Norton's e-mail objected to the College's distribution of a letter from 
an ALJ in an earlier improper practice charge filed by DUE that was ultimately withdrawn. 
College Director of Human Resources Management Paul Higgins (Higgins) 
responded to Dr. Norton's e-mail with a memorandum that stated, in pertinent part: 
In your e-mail, you assert DUE's claim that the draft of the 
academic assessment plan has contractual implications that 
must be resolved between the College and DUE. DUE does 
not have the right to negotiate the substance of the 
academic assessment plan. After an academic assessment 
plan is in place, DUE has the right to represent its members 
by filing a grievance if provisions of the academic 
- assessment plan violate the existing contract or-to seek--- - -
redress from PERB if the College has unilaterally changed 
terms and conditions of employment.2 
Following a short meeting on October 2, 2006 between Dr. Conkiin.Dean Denti, 
1
 Charging Party Exhibit 6. 
2
 Charging Party Exhibit 6. 
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Dr. Norton and Halsey, Dr. Norton and Dr. Conklin exchanged e-mails with respect to 
what transpired at that meeting. Dr. Norton's e-mail stated that at the meeting, DUE 
sought to "negotiate contractual issues regarding assessment that pertain to the DUE 
membership" but the College refused.3 Dr. Conklin did not dispute that Dr. Norton had 
demanded to negotiate but noted that the parties "differ in regard to what form [sic] 
drswssions~re^ardiffg^ 
On October 4, 2004, one day prior to the Committee presenting its final report to 
PSO, Dr. Norton sent a memorandum to DUE bargaining unit members announcing that 
an improper practice charge had been filed alleging that the College had failed to 
negotiate "over proposed changes of wages, hours and conditions of employment related 
to the conduct of assessment activities and with conducting private negotiations."5 in 
addition, the memorandum outlined four options available to PSO members following the 
presentation of the final Committee report. One of those options was for the PSO 
members to treat the report as being filed for potential later consideration so as to avoid 
approving or disapproving the report. On October 5, 2006, PSO voted to treat the final 
report as having been filed, rather than approving or disapproving it. 
On October 11, 2006, in response to PSO's decision to treat the final report as 
filed, Dr. Conklin sent a lengthy memorandum to the College's professional staff, 
including members of the DUE bargaining unit. The memorandum stated, in part: 
Academic assessment will be considered an inherent job 
responsibility of full-time faculty. Position descriptions and 
the assignment of responsibilities are not a term and 
3
 Charging Party Exhibit 7. 
4
 Charging Party Exhibit 8. 
5
 Charging Party Exhibit 9. 
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condition of employment, but the assigned duties must be 
inherent in the position.6 
Dr. Norton sent an e-mail to Dr. Conklin, on October 16, 2006, demanding that 
the College commence impact negotiations as quickly as possible with respect to the 
College's announced plan to treat academic assessment as an inherent job 
responsibility for DUE bargaining unit members: "[t]he proper term, utilized by PERB, is 
that DUE is issuing its 'demand for negotiations' on this matter."7 The following day, Dr. 
Conklin responded with an e-mail to Dr. Norton acknowledging the College's duty to 
negotiate impact but stating that such negotiations cannot take place until the academic 
assessment plan has been approved. 
On October 24, 2006, the College Board of Trustees (Board) issued a resolution 
directing Dr. Conklin to review the Committee's final report and develop an action plan, 
including a timetable, to implement the report's major recommendations. The following 
day, Dr. Conklin issued a memorandum to the professional staff advising them of the 
Board's action and announcing a plan to implement the report's recommendations. In 
response to the memorandum, Dr. Norton sent an e-mail to Dr. Conklin on October 25, 
2006 reiterating DUE's demand to commence impact negotiations and Dr. Conklin e-
mailed Dr. Norton back stating that the College was prepared to commence impact 
negotiations. Dr. Conklin requested that DUE contact the College's labor counsel to 
schedule the impact negotiations. ....- -
The record reveals that following DUE's filing of its amended charge in U-27107, 
the parties engaged in impact negotiations in November and December 2006 without 
6
 Charging Party Exhibit 10. 
7
 Charging Party Exhibit 11. 
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reaching an agreement leading to the filing of a declaration of impasse. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin with DUE's exceptions challenging the ALJ's dismissal of its direct 
dealing claim. 
Contrary to DUE's contention, an ALJ has the authority to dismiss a claim based 
uponthe^stifficiency-offactual-allegations-even aftertheDirector has conducted^an 
initial review pursuant to §204.2 of the Rules.8 An ALJ's authority to dismiss a pleading 
before a hearing is fully consistent with the,scope of discretion granted an ALJ in the 
processing of improper practice charges.9 Although the Director has the initial 
responsibility to weed out facially deficient improper practice charges, the pleading 
deficiency may not become apparent until a party has clarified its allegations in writing 
or during a pre-hearing conference. 
Prior to the hearing in the present case, DUE received explicit notice that its 
direct dealing claim was deficient and that it would not be processed. After being 
provided with multiple opportunities to clarify its direct dealing claim, and after it filed 
U-27371, DUE received two pre-hearing letters from an ALJ stating that the direct 
dealing claim would not be processed because the charges failed to allege sufficient 
facts. Therefore, we reject any contention by DUE that it was deprived of procedural 
due process when its claim was dismissed. 
We next turn to DUE's contention that the ALJ did not apply the correct legal 
standard when dismissing the direct dealing claim. Prior to dismissing a claim based on 
8
 Professional Fire Fighters Assoc, Local 274, IAFF, 23 PERB P021 (1990); Chenango 
Forks Cent SchDist (Allen), 32 PERB• TJ3060 (1999). 
9
 City ofElmira, 41 PERB 1J3018 (2008). 
Case Nos. U-27107 & U-27371 -10-
the sufficiency of a pleading, the allegations must be deemed true with the charging 
party being given every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the alleged facts.10 
In the present case, the ALJ's decision does not state explicitly whether she granted all 
reasonable inferences to DUE's allegations. Despite that omission, we do not reverse 
and remand. Following our review of the allegations contained in U-27107 and U-27371, 
1hie~multitudBnof~e~xhibits~att^ ^^  
the proper demurrer standards, we conclude that the ALJ correctly determined that DUE 
fails to state a claim for a violation of §§209-a. 1 (a) and (d) of the Act for direct dealing. 
In order to state a claim for direct dealing, an employee organization must allege 
sufficient facts that an employer impermissibly bypassed the employee organization for. 
the purpose of negotiating or attempting to negotiate with an employee or a group of 
employees aimed at reaching an agreement on the subject under discussion.11 
Accepting DUE's allegations as being true and granting it all reasonable 
inferences, its direct dealing claim is premised upon the following communications 
between the College and bargaining unit members: a) the College distributed an ALJ's 
letter to members of the bargaining unit and subsequently sent an e-mail to the 
bargaining unit responding to DUE's objection to the distribution of the ALJ's letter; b) a 
College representative told DUE representatives during a meeting that he was not 
authorized to negotiate on behalf of the College; c) Dr. Conklin spoke with two 
bargaining unit members requesting that they advise DUE that the College has made its 
final and best offer about academic assessment issues; d) Dr. Conklin spoke with 
10
 Professional Fire Fighters Assoc, Local 274, IAFF, supra, note 8. 
11
 County of Cattaraugus, 8 PERB 1J3062 (1975); City of Schenectady, 26 PERB ^3047 
(1993); Town of Huntington, 26 PERB P034 (1993); CUNY, 38 PERB P011 (2005). 
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another bargaining member about the PSO meeting on the academic assessment issue 
and told her that "you will not get what you deserve—you will have to do it (academic 
assessment) for nothing"; and e) the College provided bargaining unit members with 
information about their assessment duties.12 
A reasonable inference cannot be drawn from these alleged communications 
thattheGoirege-negotiatediwitft^ 
DUE bargaining unit with the aim of reaching an agreement. An employer's duty to 
negotiate with the exclusive bargaining agent does not, in general, prohibit that 
employer from disseminating information and documents to members of a bargaining 
unit so long as it is not aimed at impeding negotiations or subverting the fundamental 
rights of employees to organization and representation under the Act. 
Based upon our denial of DUE's exceptions challenging the ALJ's dismissal of 
the direct dealing claim, DUE's exceptions challenging the ALJ's exclusion of evidence 
relevant to that claim are also denied. 
Next, we examine DUE's exceptions challenging the ALJ's rulings excluding 
evidence with respect to its claim that the College engaged in bad faith impact 
negotiations at two sessions held in November and December 2006. Although those 
negotiation sessions took place prior to DUE filing U-27371, the allegations in that 
charge cannot be reasonably interpreted to include an independent §209-a.1(d) claim of 
bad faith negotiations. In fact, DUE's August 6, 2007 letter states explicitly that its two 
charges allege only two distinct claims: the College engaged in direct dealing and 
refused to bargain impact. Contrary to DUE's argument, its claim that the College failed 
12
 In its exceptions, DUE references additional alleged communications by the College 
that took place more than four months prior to the filing of its initial charge and, 
therefore, are untimely pursuant to §204.1(a)(1) of the Rules. 
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to engage in impact negotiations does not put into issue whether the College's 
subsequent conduct during impact negotiations was in bad faith. Additional allegations 
must have been plead in order to state that independent and distinct claim. Therefore, 
we deny the exceptions challenging the ALJ's refusal to hear DUE's claim that the 
College engaged in bad faith impact negotiations and the ALJ's exclusion of evidence 
relatedlothati3laim: 
Finally, we consider the exceptions challenging the ALJ's dismissal of DUE's 
claim that the College refused to negotiate the impact of the academic assessment. In 
New York City Transit Authority-,13 we recently reiterated that the duty to engage in 
impact negotiations "arises only upon a valid request." 
In the present case, we reject DUE's exceptions contending that the e-mail 
exchanges between Dr. Norton and the College in August and September 2006 
establish that DUE requested impact negotiations and that the College refused that 
request. Read together, the substance of the e-mails reveals that the College was 
willing to meet to discuss the draft academic assessment plan prepared by the 
Committee while DUE wanted to engage in negotiations over mandatory subjects. . 
For example, Dr. Norton's September 12, 2006 e-mail to Dean Denti states that 
DUE seeks to negotiate over compensation as well as other contractual issues. The e-
mail cannot reasonably be interpreted to constitute a request to negotiate the impact of 
a managerial decision or action that is not a mandatory subject. In fact, Dr. Norton's 
October 4, 2004 memorandum to the membership makes clear that DUE objected to 
the College's refusal to negotiate over "proposed changes of wages, hours and 
13
 41 PERB U3014 at 3077 (2008); City of Rochester, 17 PERB P082 (1984). 
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conditions of employment."14 
As the ALJ correctly determined, the first time DUE requested impact 
negotiations was in Dr. Norton's October 16, 2006 e-mail to the College wherein he 
requested to commence such negotiations as quickly as possible. • 
We also deny DUE's exceptions challenging the ALJ's conclusion that the 
Co1le~geJsnd3ta'yiff1h^^^ 
negotiate in violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act. Although the College delayed agreeing 
to negotiate impact for eight days, following receipt of DUE's initial request, we agree 
with the ALJ that, under the totality of the circumstances, the delay did not constitute a 
violation of the College's duty to negotiate. At the time of the initial request for impact 
negotiations, there had not been a College managerial decision or action on the 
Committee's report that impacted the bargaining unit's terms and conditions of 
employment.15 However, one day following the Board's directive to implement the 
report, the College met its statutory obligation by agreeing to commence impact 
negotiations.16 Under these facts, we conclude that the College did not refuse to 
negotiate impact upon DUE's request in violation of the Act. 
Charging Party Exhibit 9. 
15
 Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc., 36 PERB 1J3036 (2003). 
16
 In light of our affirmance of the ALJ's dismissal, we do not reach DUE's exception 
challenging the ALJ's alternative rationale for dismissing its failure to negotiate claim: 
mootness. Our precedent is clear, however, that the commencement of negotiations 
does not render moot a charge alleging a refusal to negotiate; but, it is relevant in 
determining the appropriate remedy. CSEA, 25 PERB ^3057 (1992); Town of 
Huntington, 27 PERB 1J3039 (1994). 
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WE, THEREFORE, ORDER that the improper practice charges must be, and 
hereby are, dismissed in their entirety. 
DATED: November 26, 2008 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DANIEL FARREY, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27677 
— - a n d - •-
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
DANIEL FARREY, pro se 
EDDIE M. DEMMINGS, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN SYKES of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Daniel Farrey (Farrey) to a 
decision by an administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge, 
as amended and clarified, filed by Farrey that alleges District Council 37, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (DC 37) violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it entered into a 2005-2008 negotiated agreement with the New York City 
School Construction Authority (SCA) modifying a compensatory time program for the 
SCA-DC 37 bargaining unit which includes Farrey's title, project officer level I (PO I), 
and whenDC 37 entered into a side letter, dated June 20, 2007, with SCA in which DC 
37 agreed that it would not pursue legal claims for overtime compensation for hours 
worked by PO I employees in excess of 40 hours per week. 
At the hearing before the ALJ, following the stipulated admission of various 
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exhibits, both parties rested after making opening statements and without calling any 
witnesses. Based on a review of the exhibits admitted into evidence, the ALJ dismissed 
the charge concluding that Farrey had failed to prove that DC 37 had violated §209-
a.2(a)oftheAct. 
EXCEPTIONS 
contending that the ALJ made various errors of fact and law. Specifically, Farrey 
asserts that the ALJ erred by: a) failing to consider a provision in the 1995-2000 
collectively negotiated agreement, and subsequent SCA-DC 37 agreements, which 
states that employees in the PO I title are exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
19381 (FLSA); b) failing to find that the FLSA provision with respect to PO I employees 
constitutes a violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act; c) failing to find that the negotiated 
compensatory time program in the 2005-2008 SCA-DC 37 agreement demonstrates a 
violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act because it adversely impacts the monetary 
compensation for members of the bargaining unit; d) failing to find that the terms of the 
June 20, 2007 side letter, along with DC 37's failure to present the side letter for 
ratification, demonstrates a violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act; and e) concluding that 
DC 37 successfully negotiated a decrease in the number of hours that bargaining unit 
employees are required to work without pay. 
DC 37 filed a response to the exceptions supporting the decision of the ALJ.2 
1
 29 USC §201 ,etseq. 
2
 Farrey was notified that the Board would not consider his pleading labeled cross-
exceptions, filed in reply to DC 37's response to his exceptions, because §213.3 of 
PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) does not permit such pleading. 
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Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
Farrey is employed by SCA as a PO I; that title, along with the titles of assistant 
project officers levels I and II (APO I and APO II), is in a SCA-DC 37 bargaining unit 
refeTTeci~to_as~UnirCr"P"0 TsTegula7ly~w67RTn ^^ 
be recalled to work in the event of an emergency.3 In addition to Unit C, DC 37 
represents a separate bargaining unit known as Unit A composed of other SCA 
employees. 
Since 1995, Article I, §2 of the Unit C negotiated agreements between SCA and 
DC 37 has stated: 
As Project Officers Level I are employed in an executive, 
administrative, or professional capacity, they are exempt 
from the maximum hours minimum wage provisions of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act. 
In contrast, the SCA-DC 37 negotiated agreements for Unit A provide that 
employees are paid overtime in accordance with the FLSA. 
In June 2007, SCA and DC 37 entered into a stipulation of settlement 
memorializing a tentative 2005-2008 agreement for Unit C. The stipulation provides 
that in a new agreement the PO I compensatory time program contained in the expired 
-Unit C agreement will be modified. The stipulation states: 
Project Officer I Compensatory Time Program - Final 
contract language will be drafted to reflect the parties' 
agreement that a Project Officer I will be entitled to receive 
one (1) hour of compensatory time for every additional hour 
3
 Transcript, p. 10. 
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worked beyond eighty (80) work hours in a two (2) week pay 
period. The Project Officer I will be able to bank on an 
annual basis up to a maximum of 112.5 compensatory time 
hours, equivalent to fifteen (15) days. SCA management 
must direct and authorize in advance all hours worked 
beyond the regular work day. In addition, SCA management 
must approve the scheduled use of compensatory time in 
advance. Any compensatory time hours not used by the end 
of each calendar year (December 31) shall be forfeited. 
Compensatory hours earned in the month of December may 
bencarrieiJiDWrfoTO 
calendar year, ending on March 31, and if not used by that 
time shall be forfeited.4 
In a side agreement, dated June 20, 2007, SCA and DC 37 agreed to the 
following: 
This is to confirm our mutual understanding and agreement 
that, based on the contract settlement between the parties 
for the duration of the agreement, October 1, 2005 through 
June 2, 2008, District Council 37 and Local 375 shall not 
bring claims in any forum against the NYC School 
Construction Authority or Department of Education, or their 
employees or agents concerning the alleged right of 
employees in the Project Officer I title to overtime 
compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 per week. 
The parties have agreed through the stipulation of settlement 
that contract language will be written to establish a Project 
Officer I Compensatory Time Program.5 
DISCUSSION 
To establish a violation of the duty of fair representation under the Act, a 
charging party has the burden of proof to demonstrate that an employee organization's 
4
 Charging Party Exhibit 4. 
5
 Charging Party Exhibit 6. 
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^ conduct or actions are arbitrary, discriminatory or founded in bad faith.6 A mere 
assertion that the negotiated terms of an agreement are not advantageous to the 
bargaining unit membership is insufficient to state a claim of a breach of the duty of fair 
representation.7 Similarly, without proof of improper motivation by an employee 
organization, the fact that the terms of a negotiated agreement are more favorable to 
soTh^b^fgalni^Unif m^eTn 
representation.8 Finally, the failure of an employee organization to conduct a ratification 
vote with respect to an agreement is insufficient to establish a breach unless the 
charging party presents evidence establishing that the failure was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith.9 
In his exceptions, Farrey contends DC 37 violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act by 
\ entering into agreements for Unit C dating back to 1995 that include Article I, §2 which 
states that the PO I title is not covered by the FLSA while the SCA-DC 37 Unit A 
agreements during the same period recognize FLSA coverage for employees in that 
separate bargaining unit. 
6
 CSEA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 132 AD2d 430, 432, 20 PERB 1J7024 at 
7039 (3d Dept 1987), affd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 117017 (1988). 
7
 O'Riordan v Suffolk Chapter, Local No. 852, 95 AD2d 800, 16 PERB TJ7511 (2d Dept 
1983), Iv denied, 60 NY2d 559 (1983); CUNY (Soffer), 20 PERB fl3051 (1987), app 
dismissed, 21 PERB fl7004 (Sup Ct NY Co 1988), mot forlvto app denied, 21 PERB 
1^7011 (1st Dept 1988) (subsequent history omitted). 
8
 Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent Sch Dist, 7 PERB fl 3058 (1974); UFT (Kauder), 18 
PERB P048 (1985); State of New YorkandPEF, 14 PERB 1J3043 (1981); Gambardella 
v County of Nassau, 168 AD2d 421, 24 PERB fi7553 (2d Dep't 1990). Litman v Bd of 
Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 170 AD2d 194, 25 PERB U7504 (2d 
Dep't 1991). 
9
 CUNY (Soffer), supra, note 7. 
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We deny Farrey's exceptions premised on Article 1, §2 for several reasons. His 
attack on Article 1, §2 is outside the scope of the allegations in his charge, as clarified 
before the ALJ,10 and the claim is otherwise untimely under §204.1 (a) of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules) which requires a charge to be filed within four months. The 
documentary evidence establishes that DC 37 negotiated the FLSA provision over a 
decade ago.-Also7the-record-lacks-any evidence-of improper-motivation-by-BC~37-when 
it negotiated different provisions in the Unit C and Unit A agreements with respect to 
FLSA applicability for the respective unit employees. 
We also deny Farrey's exceptions premised on the modified negotiated 
compensatory time program which he asserts is disadvantageous to employees in the 
PO I title because it negatively impacts their level of monetary compensation. As stated 
above, in order to establish a violation of the duty of fair representation, a charging party 
must prove more than dissatisfaction with a negotiated provision. Farrey has failed to 
present any evidence demonstrating that DC 37 acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily or in 
bad faith when it negotiated a modification to the PO I compensatory time program in 
the 2005-2008 agreement.11 Furthermore, he has not proven that the modified 
•compensatory program results in a PO I not being paid when SCA requires a PO I to 
work more than 37 1/2 hours but less than 40 hours in a week. To the extent that his 
exceptions assert that DC 37 violated the Act by entering into earlier agreements 
containing the original PO I compensatory time program, such a claim is outside the 
Administrative Law Judne Exhibit 10. 
11
 The FLSA specifically permits a collectively negotiated agreement for employees of 
political subdivisions of a State to include a provision granting compensatory time off in 
lieu of overtime compensation. 29 CFR §553.21, §7(o). 
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scope of his charge, as clarified, and is untimely under §204.1 (a) of the Rules. 
Finally, we conclude that Farrey's exceptions premised on the June 20, 2007 side 
letter, in which DC 37 agreed that it would not pursue FLSA litigation on behalf of PO I 
employees, are not supported by the record. Farrey failed to establish that DC 37's failure 
to submit the letter for ratification was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. An 
-emp1oyee~arganizatio-n-has-the-discr^ 
statutory or contractual claims against an employer so long as the employee organization 
is not improperly motivated. In the present case, the SCA-DC 37 side letter does not 
prohibit or limit the ability of bargaining unit members to pursue their own individual FLSA 
claims.12 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny Farrey's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. We, therefore, find that DC 37 did not violate §209-a.2(a) of the 
Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 26, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefk ;k/witz, CI 
^Weirs'' 
hli airman 
A 
Robert S. Hifei Member 
12 See, Barrentine v Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 US 728 (1981). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to the Board on exceptions filed by Mary Lou Hilow (Hilow) from a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
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dismissing three improper practice charges filed on April 26, 2008. The charges allege that 
the Rome Teachers Association, Inc. (Association) and the New York State United Teachers 
(NYSUT) violated §§209-a.2(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) and that the Rome City School District (District) violated §§209-a.1(a), (b), (c), (d) and (g) 
of the Act. 
The Director's decision was issued following his initial review, pursuant to §204.2(a) of 
the Rules of Procedure (Rules), and after providing Hilow with an opportunity to amend her 
charges to allege facts that constitute a violation of the Act that did not occur more than four 
months prior to the filing of the charges. Following receipt of Hilow's amendments, the Director 
dismissed the charges because the relevant alleged conduct that may have constituted a 
violation of the Act occurred more than four months before she filed her charges; he also 
dismissed the charge against NYSUT because it is not an employee organization under the 
Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In her exceptions, Hilow asserts that the Director erred in dismissing her charges 
because the respondents violated the Act when the District laid her off in 1989, and the 
Association, in conjunction with NYSUT, allegedly breached its duty of fair representation at an 
arbitration, held on December 14, 1989, with respect to a grievance challenging the District's 
recall-ofsome, but not all, of the teachers laid off in 1989. In addition, she asserts that the 
Director erred because she claims that since 1989, the respondents have violated her rights 
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act1 and other federal and.state 
1
 18 USC §§1961-1968. 
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laws. In addition, she alleges that she has been the victim of legal malpractice by a private 
attorney. Finally, she claims that her charges are timely because she has previously filed 
employment discrimination charges and complaints with federal and state agencies and 
commenced an unsuccessful federal gender discrimination lawsuit against the District.2 
Following our review of Hilow's exceptions and after consideration of her arguments, we 
deny the exceptions and affirm the decision of the Director. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 204.1(a) of the Rules requires an improper practice charge to be filed within 
four months of when the charging party had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct 
that forms the basis for the alleged improper practice.3 The time for filing a charge is not tolled 
because of the pendency of other related claims such as a grievance.4 
In the present case, Hilow has not been employed by the District since her 1989 layoff. 
Her allegations that relate to her lay-off by the District, as well as the quality of the 
representation provided by her employee organization representative in response to her layoff 
took place 19 years ago and, therefore, involve conduct that is well beyond the filing period set 
by our Rules. Hilow's pursuit of other statutory and administrative remedies since 1989 and 
her current claims of federal law violations and alleged legal malpractice by her private 
attorney during the past 19 years do not toll the four-month period for the filing of an improper 
practice charge under the Act. 
We have considered Hilow's other assertions in support of her exceptions and find 
2
 Hilow v Rome City School Dist, 1994 WL 328625 (NDNY1994) nor. 
,
 3
 Inc Vill of Rockville Centre, 28 PERB 1J3056 (1995); Otsellic Valley Cent Sch Dist, 29 PERB 
-
y
 H3005(1996). 
.
4
- New York State ThruwayAuth, 40 PERB 1J3014 (2007). 
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them to be equally without merit. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Hilow's exceptions and affirm the decision of the 
Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, dismissed in 
its entirety. 
DATED: November 26, 2008 
Albany, New York 
T R o b e r t s . K i t e , Member 
) 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Levi Mclntyre (Mclntyre) to 
a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice 
charge, as amended, filed on January 27, 2007, alleging that the Middle Island 
Administrators Association (Association) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) When it entered into a collectively negotiated agreement with 
the Longwood Central School District (District), placing Mclntyre at the highest step of 
the salary schedule thereby depriving him of step increases and resulting in him 
receiving the smallest annual salary increase among employees in the bargaining unit. 
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The Association and the District filed answers to the charge denying the 
allegations and raising various affirmative defenses, including the timeliness of the 
charge. 
Following a hearing, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the charge on the 
ground that it was filed more than four months after Mclntyre had actual knowledge of 
t h e 4 e r m s - o f 4 h e - a g r e e m e n t - a n d 4 h e - - d i s p a r t t ^ — 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Mclntyre contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that his 
charge is untimely and in dismissing the charge. Both the Association and the District 
support the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the exceptions, we 
affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the charge as untimely. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision and are repeated here only 
as necessary to decide the exceptions. 
In 2006, the Association and the District reached a tentative five-year collectively 
negotiated agreement (agreement) for the period of July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2011. 
The Association's membership ratified the agreement on February 6, 2006 and the 
parties signed it on April 4, 2006. The agreement includes both negotiated annual 
percentage increases as well as the establishment of a new 12 step salary schedule. 
Under the agreement, bargaining unit members receive yearly percentage increases. In 
addition, they receive step increases until they reach the twelfth and final step. Once a 
1
 41 PERB U4569 (2008). 
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bargaining unit member reaches the twelfth step, he or she is entitled to receive only the 
annual percentage increase. 
After receiving a copy of the agreement, Mclntyre learned that the Association and 
District had agreed to place him at the twelfth step of the salary schedule. On April 18, 
2006, Mclntyre wrote Association President Kathleen Brennan (Brennan) complaining 
that4he-agreementdenies himstep-^m^ 
would receive both annual percentage increases and step increases. He requested that 
Brennan provide him with information about the step placement of all other bargaining 
unit employees. In addition, Mclntyre stated that he intended to commence litigation to' 
enjoin the enforcement of the agreement and to pursue an employment discrimination 
claim. 
On May 5, 2006, Mclntyre sent a second letter to Brennan requesting a response 
to his April 18, 2006 correspondence and requesting additional information. In his letter, 
Mclntyre set forth his analysis of the agreement including his conclusion that he and one 
other bargaining unit member would be receiving the lowest annual salary increases of 
the employees in the 34 member unit. Ten days later, the Association's counsel sent 
Mclntyre a letter informing him that based on seniority and experience, both he and 
Association President Brennan had been placed at the top step of the salary schedule. 
In early January 2007, Mclntyre learned from the minutes of a District school 
board meeting that Brennan had given the District notice of her intent to retire effective 
July 1, 2007. According to Mclntyre, this was the first time that he learned of Brennan's 
intention to retire. 
In April 2007, the Association and District entered into a memorandum of 
agreement, ratified by the Association's membership, modifying the agreement with 
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respect to the disbursement of deferred compensation upon retirement. Mclntyre 
asserts that the April 2007 agreement benefits Brennan. Immediately following 
Brennan's retirement, effective July 1, 2007, the District rehired her to her former 
position on a per diem basis for a total of 10 days. 
DISCUSSION 
Ln-his-exceptions,-Mclntyrexon-tends4hat4he-ALJ-erred4n-concluding4hathis 
charge was untimely based upon her conclusion that Mclntyre was aware, as early as 
May 5, 2006, of the salary disparities under the agreement between himself and other 
employees in the bargaining unit. Mclntyre asserts that his claim against the 
Association for the alleged breach of its duty of fair representation accrued in early 
January 2007 after he learned that Brennan had announced her planned retirement. 
According to Mclntyre, it was Brennan's retirement announcement that purportedly led 
him to conclude that Brennan had engaged in bad faith conduct when she participated 
in the negotiations on behalf of the Association leading to the 2006 agreement. 
Following our review of the exceptions, the responses and the record, we deny 
Mclntyre's exceptions. 
It is well-settled that in determining the commencement of the four-month filing 
period under the Rules of Procedure, we consider when the charging party had actual 
or constructive knowledge of the act or acts that form the basis for the alleged violation 
of the Act.2 in the present case, we agree with the ALJ that Mclntyre's duty of fair 
representation claim accrued on or before May 5, 2006 when he sent his letter to 
2
 Inc Vill ofRockville Centre, 28 PERB 1J3056 (1995); Otselic Valley Cent Sch Dist, 29 
PERB H3005 (1996); New York State ThruwayAuth, 40 PERB 113014 (2007). 
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Brennan setting forth his analysis of the salary disparities resulting from the recently 
ratified agreement. This letter, along with Mclntyre's earlier letter to Brennan 
threatening to commence litigation challenging the disparities in the agreement, clearly 
establish that Mclntyre had actual knowledge of the act or acts that form the basis of his 
claim against the Association more than four months prior to filing his charge. The act 
.that.formsJhe_basisJor±isjclaimJsJ 
new 12-step salary schedule. Contrary to Mclntyre's argument, Brennan's retirement 
announcement, at best, may constitute additional proof of improper motivation but does 
not establish the accrual date for his charge. Similarly, the April 2007 agreement 
between the Association and District and the short term rehiring of Brennan are facts 
that may have had some relevancy to Mclntyre's claim but do not impact when his claim 
against the Association accrued under the Act. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Mclntyre's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the charge must be, and hereby is, dismissed 
in its entirety. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 26,2008 * . ^ 
Albany, New York 71 j / / y ^ 
77Jerome Leflfowitz, (Z^rairman 
^ 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board-on motions filed by Ronald Grassel (Grassel) and 
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (District) for 
leave to file exceptions, pursuant to §212.4(h) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules), 
challenging certain pre-hearing rulings of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), dated 
August 27, 2008. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On January 22, 2008, Grassel filed an improper practice charge alleging that the 
District violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it issued disciplinary charges, dated December 17, 2007, seeking his 
termination pursuant to Educ Law §3020-a. The present charge was filed by Grassel 
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after his motion to amend an earlier related charge to allege that the District had issued 
^ new disciplinary charges, and to reopen the record with respect to that earlier charge, 
was denied.1 
Prior to the scheduling of a hearing in the present case, Grassel filed an 
application seeking issuance of agency subpoenas ad testificandum and duces tecum 
pursuant to §211.3 of the Rules. In his application, Grassel requested 14 subpoenas 
ad testificandum and a subpoena duces tecum for e-mails, photographs and other 
documents related to the Educ Law §3020-a disciplinary charges. The District objected 
to Grassel's request on substantive and procedural grounds. 
The hearing was scheduled to commence on June 13, 2008. Before the 
hearing, the ALJ engaged in off-the-record discussions with the parties about the 
documents that would be received into evidence on consent, as well as, a discussion 
A with respect to the allegations in the charge. Following those discussions, the hearing 
commenced with various ALJ exhibits being placed into evidence. In addition, a 
clarification of the charge's allegations was placed on the record by the ALJ followed by 
a colloquy during which Grassel made various factual and legal arguments in support of 
the charge. Following the colloquy, the ALJ granted a District request for leave to file a 
. motion to dismiss, a briefing schedule for the motion was established and the hearing 
adjourned. 
During the June 13, 2008 hearing, Grassel did not object to the ALJ's conduct 
before or during the hearing. Later in the day, however, Grassel filed a motion 
requesting the ALJ to recuse himself from presiding over the processing of the charge. 
1
 In Bd of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Grassel), 41 PERB 1J3024 
(2008), the Board recently affirmed the ALJ's denial of Grassel's motion to amend, as 
J well as, the merits dismissal of that charge. 
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At the same time, Grassel filed a motion with the Board for leave to file exceptions 
seeking to disqualify the ALJ. On July 3, 2008, the Board denied Grassel's motion 
concluding that it was premature and that he failed to demonstrate extraordinary 
circumstances warranting the granting of leave.2 
On July 17, 2008, the District filed an amended answer adding a third, affirmative 
defense, along with a memorandum of law, asserting that the charge should be 
dismissed on the grounds that PERB lacks subject matter jurisdiction. A motion for 
particularization was filed by Grassel with respect to the amended answer. The District 
opposed Grassel's motion for particularization; Grassel opposed the District's motion to 
dismiss. 
In a ruling, in letter form, dated August 27, 2008, the ALJ denied Grassel's 
motions for recusal and particularization as well as his application for issuance of 
agency subpoenas. In addition,.the ALJ denied the District's motion to dismiss. Both 
parties now seek leave to file exceptions challenging aspects of the ALJ's pre-hearing 
rulings. 
MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO FILE EXCEPTIONS 
Grassel's motion seeks leave to file exceptions to the ALJ's denial of his motion 
for recusal and, in the alternative, requests the Board to remove the ALJ for cause and 
have the charge reassigned to another ALJ. In addition, Grassel requests leave to file 
exceptions to the denial of his motion for particularization and his application for 
subpoenas. Finally, both the District and Grassel seek leave to file exceptions to the 
denial of the District's motion to dismiss the charge. 
2
 Bd ofEduc of the City Sch Distof the City of New York (Grassel), 41 PERB P024 
(2008). 
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Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we deny the respective motions by Grassel and the District for leave to file 
exceptions. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 212.4(h) of the Rules states, in relevant part, that: 
All motions and rulings made at the hearing shall be part of 
the record of the proceeding, and unless expressly 
authorized by the board, shall not be appealed directly to 
the board, but shall be considered by the board whenever 
the case is submitted to it for decision. 
The Board will not grant leave to file exceptions to non-final rulings and decisions 
unless the moving party demonstrates extraordinary circumstances.3 The reasoning 
underlying this standard is our recognition that it is more efficient to await a final 
disposition of the merits of a charge before we examine interim determinations. The 
improvident grant of leave can result in unnecessary delays in the processing of 
improper practice charges. 
In the present case, we conclude that extraordinary circumstances do not exist 
warranting the granting of leave to file exceptions to the rulings of the ALJ. 
1. Motion to Recuse the ALJ 
Section 212.4(g) of the Rules permits a party to make a motion to an assigned 
ALJ requesting recusal from continuing to process a charge or petition. The Board will 
grant a party leave to file exceptions to the denial of such a motion when the alleged 
3
 Mt Morris Cent Sch Dist, 26 PERB 1J3085 (1993); Greenburgh No 11 Union Free Sch 
Dist, 28 PERB 1J3034 (1995); Town of Shawangunk, 29 PERB 1J3050 (1996); New York 
State Housing Finance Agency, 30 PERB ^3022 (1997); Council 82, AFSCME, 32 
PERB 1J3040 (1999); Watertown City Sch Dist, 32 PERB P022 (1999); UFT (Grassel), 
32 PERB U3071 (1999); City of Newburgh, 33 PERB P031 (2000); State of New York 
(Division of Parole), 40 PERB 1J3007 (2007); Bd of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City 
of New York (Grassel), supra, note 2; UFT (Gray), 41 PERB ^[3025 (2008). 
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facts and circumstances warrant the ALJ's disqualification.4 As the Board stated in 
State of New York (Bruns): 
We are not inclined to give interlocutory review of an ALJ's 
refusal to recuse him or herself from a proceeding on a 
party's allegations of bias except in circumstances in which 
those allegations set forth facts upon which the ALJ's 
disqualification would be required.5 
A party seeking leave to file exceptions to the denial of a recusal motion has the 
burden of presenting facts and circumstances that demonstrate the ALJ has a personal 
bias or is otherwise incapable of processing the matter in an impartial manner.6 
Objections to procedural and evidentiary rulings will rarely, if ever, constitute legitimate 
grounds for recusal or constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting the grant of 
leave for interlocutory review of an ALJ's denial of a party's motion seeking such relief. 
In,the present case, Grassel argues that the Board should grant leave to review 
the ALJ's denial of the motion for recusal and to consider whether the ALJ should be 
removed from the case. We disagree because Grassel fails to demonstrate 
extraordinary circumstances warranting the granting of such relief under §212.4(h) of 
the Rules. 
Grassel's recusal motion was premised, on purported pre-hearing statements by 
the ALJ with respect to the charge and the delays in acting upon Grassel's application 
for issuance of subpoenas.7 Grassel's allegations, even if true, are insufficient to be the 
4
 State of New York (Bruns), 25-P-ERB 1J3007 (1992); Town of Pen field, 29 PERB 
113028(1996). 
5
 25 PERB at 3022. 
6
 SAPA §303; Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 29 PERB ^3058 (1996); Town of 
Penfield, 30 PERB 1J3060 (1997). 
7
 ALJ Exhibit 12. 
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basis for the Board to grant leave to file exceptions because the purported statements 
by the ALJ and the delay in ruling on the application for subpoenas do not demonstrate 
a personal bias against Grassel or establish that the ALJ is incapable of processing the 
improper practice charge in an impartial manner. The pre-hearing efforts by the ALJ to 
clarify the charge, and to discuss other preliminary matters with the parties before going 
on the record, are consistent with his quasi-judicial responsibilities and do not constitute 
a basis for recusal. 
We next examine Grassel's request that the Board grant leave to consider his 
request that the ALJ be removed for cause and the case be reassigned to another ALJ. 
An ALJ, in general, is granted considerable discretion with respect to the processing of 
an improper practice charge including the conduct of a hearing.8 Except in extraordinary 
circumstances, the Board will review allegations that an ALJ's conduct creates a 
reasonable appearance or perception that he or she favors a particular party only in the 
context of a full record following the ALJ's merits decision and proposed order.9 A 
request to the Board for the extraordinary relief of removal of an ALJ from a pending 
case will be granted only in the most extreme situations after a party has identified 
specific and objective evidence demonstrating that the ALJ favors one party over 
another, and is incapable of presiding over the case in an impartial manner. 
Grassel does not identify any facts and circumstances that establish 
extraordinary circumstances warranting the grant of leave to consider his request that 
the ALJ be removed. Our review of the transcript of the June 13, 2008 hearing reveals 
that the ALJ treated both parties in an impartial manner and provided Grassel with a full 
8
 City ofElmira, 41 PERB 1J3018 (2008). 
9
 Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, supra, note 6. 
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and fair opportunity to clarify his factual claims and legal arguments. The ALJ's 
\ subsequent denial of the District's pre-hearing motion to dismiss belies Grassel's claim 
that the ALJ is biased against him. 
Therefore, we deny Grassel's motion for interlocutory review with respect to his 
efforts to disqualify or remove the ALJ. 
2. Motion for Particularization of District's Amended Answer 
Grassel requests that the Board grant him leave to review the ALJ's denial of his 
motion for particularization of the District's amended answer. 
Pursuant to §204.3 of the Rules, a charging party may make a motion, within ten 
working days after receipt of an answer, seeking particularization with respect to an 
affirmative defense when the answer is so vague and indefinite that the charging party 
cannot reasonably be expected to address the affirmative defense in a timely manner. 
Interim rulings with respect to pleadings will rarely create extraordinary circumstances 
justifying the grant of leave to file interlocutory exceptions unless failure to consider the 
exceptions would result in prejudice to a party that cannot be remedied upon review of 
the ALJ's final'decision and proposed order.10 
In the present case, we conclude that extraordinary circumstances do not exist to 
grant Grassel leave to file exceptions to the ALJ's denial of his motion for 
particularization. The ALJ concluded that Grassel's motion seeks particularization of 
the District's responses to the allegations of the charge; it does not seek 
particularization of the District's affirmative defenses. Grassel will not be prejudiced if 
the Board's review of the ALJ's denial of his motion is determined upon exceptions as 
he may file following the final disposition of the charge. 
) 10 See, State of New York (Bruns), note 4; UFT (Gray), supra note 3. 
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3. Denial of Grassel's Application for Subpoenas 
In Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority,11 we recently denied motions for 
leave to file exceptions with respect to the denial of requests for subpoenas reiterating 
that an ALJ is granted discretion, pursuant to §211.1 of the Rules, to grant or deny a 
request for the issuance of an agency subpoena. 
In the present case, the ALJ denied Grassel's request for the issuance of 
multiple agency subpoenas on the grounds that Grassel's request fails to sufficiently 
establish the relevancy of the testimony and documents sought. We conclude that the 
ALJ's denial of the request for subpoenas do not constitute extraordinary 
circumstances, at this junction in the present case, for the granting of interlocutory 
review. This is especially true in light of the overbroad and vexatious nature of 
Grassel's request for subpoenas. 
Next, we turn to the respective motions by the District and Grassel for leave to 
file exceptions challenging the ALJ's denial of the District's motion to dismiss the 
charge. 
4. Denial of District's Motion to Dismiss 
Both the District and Grassel seek leave to file exceptions to the denial of the 
District's motion to dismiss the charge on the grounds that PERB lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction. Neither party has demonstrated facts and circumstances that establish 
extraordinary circumstances warranting interlocutory Board review of the ALJ's pre-
hearing ruling on the District's motion to dismiss. 
Pursuant to §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act, PERB has subject matter jurisdiction 
to determine whether the District retaliated against Grassel based on protected 
11
 41 PERB H3021 (2008). 
Case No. U-28124 -9-
activities when it acted, pursuant to Educ Law §3020-a, in issuing disciplinary charges 
against him in December 2007. Under the Act, PERB has jurisdiction to determine 
whether an employer's invocation of a statutory procedure is unlawfully motivated.12 
Nevertheless, in light of our recent affirmance13 of the merits dismissal of 
Grassel's earlier related charge, nothing in this decision shall preclude the District from 
renewing its motion to dismiss, on other grounds, before the ALJ. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the motions by Grassel and the District for 
leave to file exceptions and remand the case to the ALJ for further processing 
consistent with this decision. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 26, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Robert S.'hfite, Member 
12
 See, City of Albany v Pub Empi Rei Bd, 57 AD2d 374, 10 PERB 1J7012 (3d Dept 
1977), affd 43 NY2d 954, 11 PERB ^7007 (1978J; CSEA v Pub EmpI Rel Bd 267 AD2d 
935, 32 PERB ^{7027 (3d Dept 1999) (subsequent history omitted). 
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 This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the New York State 
Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) and a 
cross-exception by the State of New York (Division of Parole)(Division) from a decision 
by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice charge filed by 
NYSCOPBA, finding the Division violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by issuing and pursuing a sixth disciplinary specification 
against Jeffrey H. Levy (Levy), a NYSCOPBA chief sector steward, in retaliation for the 
content of an "e-mail Levy sent to other bargaining unit members, but dismissing all 
other aspects of NYSCOPBA's charge. 
The ALJ's proposed order directs the Division to refrain from disciplining Levy for 
communicating with bargaining unit members concerning his interpretation of the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement. • 
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EXCEPTIONS 
- A NYSCOPBA excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that, other than the sixth 
specification, it failed to meet its burden of proof demonstrating that the notice of 
discipline issued to Levy was in retaliation for his e-mail, and therefore, violated §§209-
a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act. NYSCOPBA also challenges the proposed order contending 
that the ALJ erred in failing to order the Division to withdraw the entire notice of 
discipline and to vacate the five week suspension without pay penalty imposed by the 
disciplinary arbitrator who determined Levy's guilt and innocence with respect to the 
specifications contained in the notice of discipline. However, NYSCOPBA supports the 
ALJ's conclusion that the Division violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act by seeking to 
discipline Levy for his e-mail. 
In the Division's cross-exception, it contends that the ALJ erred by purportedly 
granting deference to the disciplinary arbitrator on the question of Levy's motivation in 
sending the e-mail and the protected nature of its content. The Division also asserts 
that the ALJ erred in concluding that Levy's e-mail constitutes protected activity under 
the Act. The Division supports the ALJ's dismissal of the remainder of the charge. 
Based, upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we grant NYSCOPBA's exceptions, in part, deny the Division's cross-exception and 
affirm the ALJ's decision in all other respects. 
FACTS 
For over a decade, Levy has been employed by the Division in the title of warrant 
and transfer officer (WTO). The Division employs approximately 14 WTOs who work 
primarily from their respective homes. The work week for a WTO is Monday-Friday and 
their work day is 8:30 am-4:30 pm. Their duties include the interstate custodial 
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extradition of parole violators, apprehended outside of New York State, to a New York 
correctional facility. 
When a WTO is not assigned to an interstate extradition, he or she is required to 
report to a Division office to perform other assigned WTO duties. Such offices are 
located in various parts of the State including Albany and Buffalo. Levy and another 
WTO are assigned to the warrant bureau office in Albany, and their immediate 
supervisor is Christine Bianco (Bianco). Over the years, there have been labor-
management discussions and disagreements between the Division and NYSCOPBA 
concerning WTO office work and time and attendance while in the office. 
The WTO title is the sole Division title in the Security Services Unit (SSU) 
represented by NYSCOPBA. For over seven years, Levy has been NYSCOBA's chief 
sector steward representing WTO employees. His duties as chief sector steward 
include advising members of their contractual rights, advocating for members, filing 
contract grievances, filing improper practice charges and participating in labor-
management meetings. In his role as chief sector steward, Levy frequently interacts 
with the Division's Director of Human Resource Management Jose Burgos (Burgos). 
During his tenure with the Division, Levy has received positive work performance 
evaluations along with commendations. Prior to December 2005, Levy had not been 
the subject of discipline; he did receive, however, written counseling memoranda with 
respect to his job performance. In addition, Levy's time and attendance has been the 
subject of supervisory concerns for many years. 
In August 2005, the area supervisor of the Division's warrant bureau, Michael 
DePietro (DePietro), issued a memorandum to all WTOs, including Levy, reiterating 
prior directives with respect to WTO time and attendance. DePietro's memorandum 
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was issued in response to the continuing problem of WTO non-compliance with Division 
A, time and attendance rules when assigned to office duties. The memorandum states: 
This is a reminder with respect to a prior directive to you that 
on days that you are not scheduled for an extradition trip, 
that you have the responsibility of reporting to the 
area/bureau office to which you are assigned by 08:30 a.m., 
and that the expectation is that you are to remain at that 
location until the end of the workday (4:30 p.m.), unless 
authorization for time off has been authorized by this office. 
You_areJo_„repoj±ioJ^^^ 
prepared, with all agency issued equipment necessary to 
perform any and all duties you may be assigned by the Area 
Supervisor or his designee. 
Election Day is defined as a holiday in Article 16.5 of the parties' collectively 
negotiated agreement (agreement). Pursuant to §16.1 of the agreement, an employee 
who is "scheduled or required to work on a holiday" is entitled to choose between 
premium pay for the holiday worked or a compensatory day in lieu of the holiday 
worked. 
According to Levy's interpretation of the agreement, when State offices are open 
on a week day holiday, the day constitutes a regularly scheduled work day. However, 
when Division offices are closed on a week day holiday, WTOs are not scheduled for 
work. Levy testified to a practice of WTOs working Election Day as a regularly 
scheduled work day unless the Division provided advanced notification that a WTO 
would not be scheduled for work that day. 
In contrast, Burgos testified that in 2002, 2003 and 2004, he had conversations 
with Levy's supervisors regarding whether WTOs work on Election Day. According to 
Burgos, he directed the supervisors to relay to Levy that unless there was an 
operational need to schedule a WTO for an extradition on Election Day, the WTO 
should not report to work. 
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Prior to Election Day, November 8, 2005, the Division asked all WTOs whether 
they wanted to work on that holiday with some responding in the affirmative. Levy stated 
that two weeks before Election Day he had a conversation with his immediate 
supervisor Bianco. During their conversation, Levy told Bianco that he wanted to work 
on Election Day and also informed Bianco about the past practice in which a WTO 
worked the holiday unless informed by the Division that he or she was not scheduled to 
work that day. It is undisputed that Bianco never informed Levy that he was not 
scheduled to work on Election Day.1 
After learning of specific Election Day assignments given to some bargaining 
unit members, while others had not received any notification about working on Election 
Day, Levy sent an e-mail on November 5, 2005 to members of the bargaining unit. The 
electronic message was sent, while Levy was off-duty, from his home computer utilizing 
a NYSCOBA e-mail account to the personal e-mail addresses of bargaining unit 
members. The e-mail states in relevant part: 
Article 16.1 of our contract requires that a NYSCOPBA-
represented employee will be paid 'one-tenth of his biweekly 
rate of compensation' if we are scheduled to work on a 
holiday. Election Day is defined by Article 16.5 of our 
contract as a holiday. As you know, Election Day is this 
Tuesday which is a regularly scheduled work day. Except 
for those of us who are approved for time-off on Tuesday, 
we should claim Holiday Pay. 
To claim Holiday Pay, complete one section on the overtime 
sheet using the overtime code that is appropriate for the type 
of work you performed and include the words'Holiday Pay' 
in that section. (For your convenience, a copy of the new 
overtime codes that must be used beginning with this pay 
period is included below.) The number of hours you should 
claim is 7.5 hours. If you work any overtime on Tuesday, 
that time should be claimed by completing an additional 
1
 Although Bianco testified at the disciplinary arbitration, the Division did not call her as 
a witness during the hearing before the ALJ. 
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section on the overtime sheet just as you would any other 
day. 
' • \ 
At this time it is my understanding that the four of the five 
Warrant Officers who have specific work assignments for 
Election Day (this Tuesday) are at the bottom of our seniority 
list. Three WO's have training assignments and two WO's 
have out-of-state return assignments. Two PO's have out-
of-state return assignments. A few WO's requested to be off 
Tuesday. The rest of us should report to our offices as we 
always do on regularly scheduled workdays. 
For bargaining unit members without a personal e-mail address, such as Buffalo 
based WTO Armando Russi, Levy faxed a hard copy of the e-mail. In response to the 
fax, Russi called Levy. During their conversation, Levy reiterated the substance of his 
e-mail and his intention to report to work on Election Day. 
On Election Day, Levy and Russi went to work in their respective offices in 
Albany and Buffalo. Both offices were open with other employees, including Bianco, at 
work. After Levy reported to work, Bianco sent an e-mail to Burgos, DePietro and other 
supervisors stating, inter alia, that Levy was in the office and that she learned informally 
that Levy had sent a written communication to other bargaining unit members about 
reporting to work on Election Day. It is undisputed that Levy and Russi were not 
directed to leave work that day nor was Bianco directed by her supervisors to order 
Levy to leave the Albany office. 
Two days later, Bianco sent a memorandum requiring the WTOs who reported 
for work on Election Day to submit a detailed accounting of their work activities that day. 
Exempted from the directive were two WTOs who were scheduled for training on 
Election Day and five WTOs who advised Bianco that they were unavailable to work on 
that holiday. Levy and Russi'each responded in writing to Bianco delineating their 
respective work activities on Election Day. 
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On November 18, 2005, Russi sent a follow-up memorandum to Deputy Director 
of Operations William Barhold (Barhold) waiving any claim to premium pay for Election 
Day and stating: 
After speaking with my Head Union Steward, Jeff Levy, it 
was my impression that under union contract rules, I was to 
report to the office for work that day as I did not request the 
time off nor was I scheduled for a trip. 
Although Levy did not work on November 18, 2005, he submitted a time sheet for 
the applicable period indicating that he worked on that day. After being confronted with 
this discrepancy at a disciplinary interrogation on December 7, 2008, Levy informed the 
Division that the discrepancy was the result of an error when he prepared the time sheet 
from his own records. According to Levy's testimony, in the past, when the Division 
found similar discrepancies in a WTO's time sheet, it had permitted the employee to 
correct the time sheet and use accrued leave without the Division imposing a 
disciplinary sanction. 
In late November, 2005, Levy and another WTO were assigned to an extradition 
of a parolee apprehended in Tennessee. As part of their assignment, Levy and his co-
worker were expected, upon arriving at Albany International Airport, to transfer the 
parolee to two Division parole officers for transport to Schoharie County jail. At the 
airport, after leaving two voice messages on Levy's state-owned cell phone, parole 
officer Mary Kopp (Kopp) telephoned the Division's warrant bureau to advise them that 
Levy was not reachable. Later, when Levy and the other WTO transferred the parolee 
to the custody of the parole officers, Levy did not have the required certified warrant and 
other paperwork. This resulted in Kopp calling the warrant bureau again requesting the 
preparation of the necessary form. Subsequently, Bianco directed Kopp by telephone 
to take custody of the parolee and return to the Division office for the necessary 
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paperwork before transporting the parolee to the county jail. The following day, at the 
request of DePietro and Bianco, Kopp and the other parole officer prepared a written 
memorandum describing Levy's conduct and comments at the airport including Levy 
questioning the assignment of parole officers to transport a parolee from the airport. 
On December 7, 2005, Burgos conducted a disciplinary interrogation of Levy. 
During the interrogation, Burgos attempted to question Levy with respect to the content 
of his November 5, 2005 e-mail to bargaining unit members. Following an assertion of 
privilege by Levy's NYSCOPBA attorney as to the e-mail's content, Levy acknowledged 
sending an e-mail. The record reveals that during the interrogation Levy was 
questioned about other issues, including his time and attendance. Following the 
interrogation, Burgos notified Levy that until the Division's disciplinary investigation was 
completed, his assignment would be limited to working in the warrant bureau office in 
Albany. 
On December 12 and 21, 2005, Levy was late for work without authorization. In 
his time sheet for December 12, 2005, he stated that that he had arrived at work at 9:30 
am instead of his actual later time of arrival. 
After completion of the Division's investigation, Burgos issued a notice of 
discipline seeking Levy's termination, along with a notice of suspension without pay, on 
December 27, 2005. The notice of discipline includes nine specified accusations 
against Levy: 
1) On December 1, 2005 you violated Employee Manual Article 17, 
item #9 and Article 6, item #5 when you falsified your Time and 
Accrual Sheet and reported that you worked on November 18, 2005 
when, in fact, you did not. 
2) On November 18, 2005 you violated Employee Manual Article 6, 
item #3 when you failed to report for duty as scheduled and failed 
Case No. U-26734 -9-
to secure the approval of your supervisors for your absence as 
required. 
3) On November 23, 2005 at approximately 4:15 p.m. while at the 
Albany County Airport you deliberately interfered with the 
operations of the Warrant and Transfer Unit when you failed to turn 
over the warrant, the 9011 and the Violation of Release Report to 
P.O. Kopp and Carey. 
4) On November 23, 2005 you failed to turn on your state issued cell 
phone upon arrival at the Albany County Airport at approximately 
4:00 p.m. thereby interfering with P.O. Kopp's ability to contact you. 
5) On November 8, 2005 you reported to the Warrant Unit at Russell 
Road Albany, NY when you had not been scheduled or required to 
work in order to declare yourself eligible for Holiday pay. You 
subsequently submitted a claim for Holiday pay on November 18, 
2005 that you were not entitled to make. 
6) On November 5, 2005 you interfered with the operation of the 
Warrant and Transfer Unit when you provided other Warrant and 
Transfer officers erroneous instructions indicating that November 8, 
2005 was a regularly scheduled work day for which a claim for 
Holiday pay should be made. 
7) On December 12, 2005 you violated Employee Manual Article 6, 
item #3 when you failed to report for duty at 8:30 a.m. as scheduled 
and failed to secure advance authorization for your absence 
between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. 
8) On December 12, 2005 you violated Employee Manual Article 17, 
item #9 when you falsified your Time and Accrual sheet and 
reported your start time on December 12, 2005 at 9:30 a.m. 
9) On December 21, 2005 you violated Employee Manual Article 6, 
item #3 when you failed to report for duty at 8:30 a.m. as scheduled 
and failed to secure advance authorization for your absence 
between the hours of 8:30 and 10:00 a.m. 
It is undisputed that the Division did not seek to "discipline Russi for coming to 
work on Election Day. During his testimony, Burgos testified that Russi was not 
disciplined because Russi informed the Division that he went to work on Election Day 
based on Levy's contractual advice and because Russi, unlike Levy, voluntarily agreed 
not to seek premium pay for working on Election Day. 
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consistent with a negotiated State of New York-NYSCOPBA expedited 
disciplinary arbitration procedure, the merits of the notices of discipline and suspension, 
along with the proposed penalty of termination, were scheduled to be heard by a 
disciplinary arbitrator. In preparation for the arbitration, NYSCOPBA vice-president of 
law enforcement Keith Zulko (Zulko) met with Burgos in his office for the purpose of 
obtaining Levy's personnel file and other documents. During the meeting, Burgos, in a 
frustrated manner, told Zulko that NYSCOPA and its membership would be better off 
without Levy as its chief sector steward. 
During the course of the arbitration, the arbitrator issued an interim decision 
finding that the Division lacked probable cause to suspend Levy and ordered his 
reinstatement, pending the outcome of the arbitration, with two caveats: Levy would 
work only in the Division's Albany office and he would not be eligible for overtime during 
the period that he is "grounded." 
On April 12, 2006, the disciplinary arbitrator issued a 12 page opinion and award 
containing various findings of relevant facts and conclusions. The arbitrator found Levy 
guilty of the five disciplinary specifications which alleged time and attendance 
misconduct and the arbitrator imposed a five week suspension without pay. The 
arbitrator found Levy not guilty of the four remaining specifications in the notice of 
discipline. 
DISCUSSION 
We commence our discussion with the Division's cross-exception because, if we 
sustain the Division's cross-exception, NYSCOPBA's exceptions become moot. The 
Division contends that the ALJ erred in deferring to the disciplinary arbitrator's decision 
with respect to Levy's intent and the protected nature of his e-mail. It also asserts that 
Case No. U-26734 -11-
the ALJ erred in concluding that Levy's e-mail constitutes protected activity under the 
Act. 
A(1). Deferral to the Disciplinary Arbitration Decision and Award. 
Our focus in an improper practice charge under §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, 
challenging disciplinary actions taken against an employee is determining whether the 
initiation, pursuit or imposition of the discipline is improperly motivated. In contrast, in 
most disciplinary cases, the issues to be determined are whether the employee is guilty 
of the alleged misconduct or incompetence and, if so, what is the appropriate 
disciplinary penalty.2 In some disciplinary cases, however, the parties may choose to 
present to the arbitrator a stipulated issue for arbitral determination as to whether the 
employer was improperly motivated under the Act, or other laws3 in pursuing the 
disciplinary charges. 
In State of New York (ben Aamanf the Board held that when a charge alleges 
that an employer is improperly motivated under the Act in pursuing discipline against an 
employee, it is appropriate for the ALJ to admit into evidence a related disciplinary 
arbitration decision and defer to arbitral findings so long as the issues were fully litigated 
in the arbitration, the arbitration was not tainted by serious procedural irregularities and 
the decision and award are not repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Taylor 
2
 City of Albany, 9 PERB 1J3055 (1976), confd sub nom; City of Albany v New York State 
Public Empl Re I Bd, 57 AD2d 374, 10 PERB fl7Q12 (3d. Dept 1977), 43 NY2d_954, 11 
PERB U7007 (1978); Holbrook Fire Dist, 31 PERB P084 (1998), vacated, CSEA v New 
York State Public Empl Rel Bd, 267 AD2d 935, 32 PERB ^7027 (3d Dept 1.999) 
(subsequent history omitted). See also, Bd of Educ, Cent Sch Dist No. 1 of Town of 
Grand Island v Helsby, 64 Misc2d 473, 3 PERB 1J7011 (S Ct, Erie Co, 1970), rev, 37 
AD2d 493, 4 PERB 1J7016 (4th Dept 1971), affd 32 NY2d 660, 6 PERB 1J7004 (1973). 
3
 See, Civ Serv Law §75-b.3(a); Matter of Obot, 89 NY2d 883 (1996). 
4
 11 PERB P084 (1978). 
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Law.5 However, in Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga BOCES, the Board held that a conditional 
deferral dismissal of a charge alleging violations of §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act to 
await arbitral findings is inappropriate.6 
In its cross-exception, the Division contends that the ALJ inappropriately deferred 
to the disciplinary arbitrator's conclusions with respect to Levy's e-mail when the ALJ 
concluded that the e-mail is protected under the Act. We disagree. 
First, the grant of deference by the ALJ on those issues would have been 
inappropriate in the present case because they were not included in the stipulated 
issues presented to the arbitrator and, therefore, were not fully litigated.7 The stipulated 
arbitral issues were limited to traditional questions of guilt or innocence, probable cause 
to suspend and the appropriate penalty, if any. Furthermore, the Division's sixth 
disciplinary specification did not call upon the arbitrator to determine whether Levy 
deliberately intended to provide members of the bargaining unit with false information or 
to maliciously injure the employer, standards applicable under the Act. The specification 
alleged only that the information provided by Levy was "erroneous" and that his off-duty 
communication itself allegedly interfered with operations. 
Upon our review of the record and the ALJ's decision, we conclude that the ALJ 
did not grant deference to the arbitrator's decision on Levy's motivation in sending the 
e-mail or whether such conduct is protected under the Act, although the ALJ did 
properly grant deference to the arbitrator's findings of fact relevant to determining 
5
 In significant contrast, §205.5(d) of the Act explicitly prohibits such issue preclusion to 
findings of fact or law made by a disciplinary hearing officer appointed pursuant Civ 
Serv Law §75. 
634PERBff3019(2001). 
J NYCTA (Bordansky), 4 PERB fl3031 (1971). 
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whether Levy was guilty of the disciplinary allegations. The administrative record 
establishes that the ALJ permitted both parties to present proof related to Levy's 
motivation in sending the e-mail. In concluding that the e-mail is protected, the ALJ 
relied upon the record before him to find that the Division did not meet its burden of 
persuasion by demonstrating that the e-mail is outside the scope of protected activities 
under the Act. When setting forth his rationale, the ALJ did not cite to the arbitrator's 
findings of fact or law with respect to Levy's e-mail. 
Therefore, we deny the Division's cross-exception asserting that the ALJ 
improperly deferred to the arbitrator's decision and award. 
A(2). Levy's E-mail is Protected Activity under the Act 
We next consider the Division's argument that Levy's e-mail constitutes 
unprotected activity under the Act and, therefore, that the ALJ erred in finding a violation 
of §§209-a,1(a) and (c) of the Act. The Division asserts the e-mail is unprotected 
because the content encouraged bargaining unit members to report to work on Election 
Day as a protest for extradition assignments to less senior bargaining unit members for 
Election Day. 
As we reiterated in United Federation of Teachers (Jenkins),8 a charging party in 
an improper practice charge, alleging unlawfully motivated employer conduct in violation 
of §209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, has the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
evidence that: a) the charging party engaged in protected activity under the Act; b) such 
activity was known to the person or persons taking the employment action; and c) the 
41 PERB U3007 (2008). 
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employment action would not have been taken "but for" the protected activity.9 
Therefore, as an initial matter, we must determine whether Levy's e-mail constitutes 
protected activity under the Act. 
Mere inaccurate statements by an employee are protected under the Act, 
regardless of whether an employer or its representatives are disturbed by the 
inaccuracies unless the employer establishes that the employee's comments were 
deliberately intended to falsify or were maliciously aimed at injuring the employer.10 
Employee grievances and contract claims are also protected under the Act unless an 
employer demonstrates that they are undeniably frivolous.11 Finally, an otherwise 
protected activity may be found to be unprotected under the Act when, under the totality 
of the circumstances, the conduct is found to be impulsive, overzealous, confrontational 
or disruptive.12 
In the present case, we reject the Division's argument that Levy's e-mail is 
deliberately false or maliciously aimed at causing harm to the Division by encouraging 
an improper bargaining unit protest. The Division's argument is inconsistent, if not 
contradicted, by its sixth disciplinary specification. The notice of discipline issued to 
9
 City of Salamanca, 18 PERB f3012 (1985); Town of Independence, 23 PERB P020 
(1990); County of Orleans, 25 PERB fl3010 (1992); Stockbridge Valley Cent Sch Dist, 
26 PERB 1J3007 (2000); County of Wyoming, 34 PERB P042 (2001). 
10
 Plainedge Public Schools, 13 PERB |{3037(1980); Binghamton City Sch Dist, 22 
PERB U3034 (1989); Walls Mfg Co v NLRB, 321 F2d 753 (DC Cir 1963), cert denied, 
375 US 923 (1963). 
11
 NYCTA, 37 PERB 1J3013 (2004). 
12
 State of New York (ben Aaman), supra, note 5; Kings Park Cent Sch Dist, 24 PERB fl 
3026 (1991); Erie County Water Auth, 24 PERB P046 (1991); Greenburgh No. 11 
Union Free Sch Dist, 30 PERB p052 (1997), confsub nom, Greenburgh No. 11 Union 
Free Sch Dist v Kinsella, 253 AD2d 46, 32 PERB 1J7004 (3d Dept 1999) Iv. denied, 93 
NY2d 810,32 PERB fi7014 (1999). 
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Levy alleged only that Levy's communication contained erroneous information and the 
off-duty distribution of the information interfered with Division operations. The notice did 
not allege that Levy's purpose was to encourage an improper and unprotected protest 
over assignments to less senior employees. 
In addition, upon our review of the record, we agree with the ALJ that the 
evidence establishes that the e-mail constitutes protected activity under the Act. While 
the Division presented evidence as to its own interpretation of the applicable contract 
language, it has not demonstrated that Levy's e-mail discussion of the contract is 
intentionally false, maliciously aimed at injuring the Division or that it is undeniably 
frivolous. We conclude that, at best, the record is ambiguous with respect to whether a 
WTO is to work on Election Day and is, thereby, entitled to premium pay under the 
agreement. 
Moreover, there is insufficient evidence for us to conclude that Levy or 
NYSCOBPA previously agreed with the Division's contract interpretation and that Levy 
sent the e-mail for an illegitimate purpose. Burgos testified to receiving annual requests 
for clarification from Levy's supervisors as to whether a WTO had a contract right to 
work on Election Day. In response to these inquiries, Burgos asked the supervisors to 
relay to Levy and other WTOs the Division's view that Election Day is a fixed holiday 
and only WTOs assigned to extraditions should report to work. The evidence does not 
establish what information, if any, was relayed to Levy or that Levy fully or partially 
concurred with the Division's view. Indeed, Levy's annual inquiries support the 
conclusion that he did not agree with the Division. Moreover, the failure of supervisor 
Bianco to send Levy or Russi home on Election Day, along with the request that all 
WTOs prepare a memorandum describing the work he or she performed on Election 
Day, supports the conclusion that the on-going contract issue is unresolved. 
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We also conclude that the context and content of Levy's e-mail establishes that it 
r^ does not constitute impulsive, overzealous, confrontational or disruptive behavior which 
would render it unprotected under the Act. The off-duty e-mail merely encourages 
j bargaining unit members to engage in a concerted activity by asserting an alleged 
contract right to report to work on Election Day and seek premium pay. Such advice and 
advocacy by Levy, on its face, cannot be reasonably construed as being intended to 
; _ 
cause a disruption, confrontation, or to instigate an unprotected protest by the 
bargaining unit over less senior employees receiving an assignment. Finally, the 
Division failed to present any evidence establishing that the content of the off-duty e-
mail interfered, in any manner, with Division operations as alleged in the sixth 
! disciplinary specification.13 
It is undisputed that Burgos, the Division representative who conducted the 
^ disciplinary investigation and issued the notice of discipline, was aware of Levy's e-mail, 
attempted to interrogate Levy over the content of the e-mail and took adverse action 
against Levy by charging him, in the sixth specification, with misconduct for the e-mail. 
" Based upon the foregoing, we deny the Division's cross-exception and affirm the 
ALJ's conclusion that the Division violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) by initiating and 
pursuing disciplinary charges against Levy for his e-mail. 
A. NYSCOPBA's Exceptions 
We now examine NYSCOPBA's exceptions claiming that it met its burden of 
proving that "but for" the e-mail, the Division would not have issued and pursued the 
eight other disciplinary specifications against Levy. 
13
 We would reach a different result, in the present case, if Levy's contract interpretation 
led him and other WTOs to refuse to report to work on the holiday despite a prior 
Division notice stating that the holiday would be a regular work day. See, Farmingdale 
Union Free Sen Dist, 11 PERB 1J3055 (1978); Island Trees Public Schools, 14 PERB 
fi3020(1981). 
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If a charging party does not present direct evidence of improper employer 
motivation, it must present sufficient circumstantial evidence to create an inference that 
the employer was improperly motivated. If such an inference is established, the burden 
of persuasion shifts to the respondent to rebut the inference by presenting evidence 
establishing that its actions were motivated by a legitimate non-discriminatory business 
reason. If the respondent establishes a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, then the 
burden shifts back to the charging party to establish that the articulated non-
discriminatory reason is pretextual. At all times, the charging party has the burden of 
proof to establish the requisite causation by a preponderance of evidence.14 
Upon our review of the record, we grant NY.SCOPBA's exceptions; in part, and 
reverse the ALJ's decision to the extent that it dismissed the charge's allegation that the 
Division's fifth specification is improperly motivated. In the fifth specification, the 
Division sought to discipline Levy for reporting to work on Election Day and seeking 
premium pay for working that day. 
NYSCOBA presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to create an inference 
that the fifth specification is improperly motivated and the Division failed to establish a 
non-discriminatory reason for issuing and pursuing that specification. The fifth 
specification alleges that Levy engaged in the exact conduct he recommended to the 
bargaining unit in his e-mail. Therefore, it is directly intertwined with the sixth 
specification that we have concluded is improperly motivated. In addition, the fifth 
specification attempts to discipline Levy for seeking to establish a necessary pre-
condition for pursuing a contract remedy based on his understanding of the parties' 
agreement. Notably, the Division did not allege in the disciplinary specification that 
Supra, notes 8 and 9. 
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Levy disrupted Division operations by reporting to work and it did not prove at the 
A hearing that Levy's actions on Election Day were disruptive or confrontational. 
In addition, NYSCOPBA presented evidence of the Division's disparate treatment 
of Russi and Levy along with evidence of Burgos' animus toward Levy as a NYSCOPBA 
representative. Like Levy, Russi reported to work on Election Day and provided a 
memorandum to Bianco outlining his activities on that holiday. Nevertheless, Russi was 
not disciplined. The explanation given by Burgos for the disparate treatment only 
reinforces the evidence of the Division's improper motivation. According to Burgos, 
Russi was not disciplined because he relied on Levy's advice and Russi, unlike Levy, 
agreed to waive a claim for premium pay. Based upon the protected nature of Levy's 
communication to the bargaining unit and the facts and circumstances of the present 
case, we do not find Burgos' explanation to constitute a legitimate non-discriminatory 
explanation for the Division's disparate treatment. Furthermore, during his testimony 
Burgos did not rebut or explain his undisputed comment to NYSCOPBA representative 
Zulko that the bargaining unit members would be better off without Levy as chief sector 
steward.15 
With respect to the five disciplinary specifications issued to Levy alleging time 
and attendance abuse, we conclude that NYSCOPBA did not met its burden of proof of 
establishing improper motivation. Although NYSCOPBA established an inference of 
improper motivation with respect to those specifications, it failed to rebut the non-
discriminatory explanation provided by the Division. 
15
 While we agree with the ALJ that Burgos' comment to NYSCOPBA representative 
Zulko constitutes only circumstantial evidence of animus, we disagree with the ALJ's 
conclusion as to the probative value of the comment. We draw a negative inference 
against the Division based upon Burgos' failure, during his testimony, to refute or 
explain his comment to Zulko. Cf, Village of New Paltz, 25 PERB ff3032 (1992). . 
Case No. U-26734 -19-
The record establishes that, in the past, the Division was lax in strictly enforcing 
the WTO time and attendance rules. In addition, the lack of prior discipline against 
Levy, along with the timing of the notice of discipline, is suggestive of an improper 
Division motive for the time and attendance specifications. However, the Division met its 
burden of persuasion by presenting sufficient evidence establishing a legitimate non-
discriminatory explanation for the specifications: the August 2005 memorandum to ali 
WTOs reiterating prior time and attendance directives along with prior persistent 
supervisory concerns over Levy's time and attendance. NYSCOPBA failed to 
demonstrate that those non-discriminatory reasons are pretextual. 
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the two disciplinary specifications 
about Levy's conduct at the airport in November 2005. Although the timing of the 
specifications are suggestive of an improper motivation, the evidence establishes that 
the Division pursued the specifications as the direct result of the verbal and written 
reports from two parole officers about Levy's behavior and comments and the fact that 
Levy's conduct resulted in an unnecessary delay in the transport of a parolee to a 
county jail. 
Finally, consistent with our findings as to the merits of the charge, we deny 
NYSCOPBA's claim that the ALJ erred in not ordering the Division to withdraw the 
notice of discipline and vacate the penalty imposed by the disciplinary arbitrator. An 
order requiring the withdrawal of the fifth and sixth specification is unnecessary in light 
of the disciplinary arbitrator's earlier dismissal of those specifications. Similarly, an 
order requiring the vacatur of the five week disciplinary penalty, imposed by the 
arbitrator, is inappropriate in light of our conclusion that the Division was not improperly 
motivated in pursuing the time and attendance specifications; However, we have 
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modified the proposed order consistent with our decision that the sixth as well as the 
fifth specifications in the notice of discipline are improperly motivated.16 
Based upon the foregoing, we grant the NYSCOPBA's exceptions, in part, deny 
the Division's cross-exception and modify the remedial order. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Division of Parole shall: 
1. cease and desist from disciplining or seeking to discipline NYSCOPBA 
chief sector steward Jeffrey H. Levy for communicating with bargaining 
unit members concerning his interpretation of the parties' collective; 
bargaining agreement; 
2. cease and desist from disciplining or seeking to discipline NYSCOPBA 
chief sector steward Jeffrey H. Levy for working on Election Day, 2005 
and seeking premium pay for working on that day; 
3. sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used to 
post notices to employees of.the Division of Parole in the NYSCOPBA 
represented bargaining unit. 
DATED: November 26, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Jerome LefkolWitz, Chairman 
'••• Roberts'. Hite, Member 
16
 Our decision and order, however, should not be construed as finding that Levy is 
entitled, under the parties' agreement, to premium pay for working on Election Day. 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOY 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (Division of Parole) 
represented by the New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) that the State of New York (Division of Parole) will: 
1. Refrain from disciplining or seeking to discipline NYSCOPBA chief sector 
steward Jeffrey H. Levy for communicating with bargaining unit members 
concerning his interpretation of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement; and 
2. Refrain from disciplining or seeking to discipline NYSCOPBA chief 
sector steward Jeffrey H. Levy for working on Election Day, 2005 
and seeking premium pay for working on that day. 
Dated By 
"""'"' (Representative) "'"" (Title) 
State of New York (Division of Parole) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS DINARDO, Jr., 
Petitioner, 
=and_ , -CASE_N.CL-Cs5J8.Jj5-
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
-and-
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, LOCAL 983, AMERICAN 
FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
LAW OFFICES OF CHAIKIN & CHAIKIN (ERIC CHAIKIN, ESQ., of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
MICHELLE SHERIDAN, ESQ., for Employer 
THOMAS COOKE, ESQ., for Intervenor/lncumbent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On July 14, 2008, Thomas DiNardo, Jr. (petitioner) filed a timely petition for 
decertification of District Council 37, Local 983, American Federation of State, County, 
and Local Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, (intervenor), the current negotiating 
representative for employees in the following unit: 
Included: High pressure plant tenders and plant maintainer tenders. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
A ... 
Upon consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held on October 23, 2008. 
The results of this election show that the majority of eligible employees in the unit who 
cast valid ballots no longer desire to be represented for purposes of collective 
negotiations by the intervenor.1 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: November 26, 2008, 
Albany, New York 
Ro5ert S'Hite, Mem'be 
1
 Of the 25 ballots cast, 3 were for representation and 22 against representation. There were no 
challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner,-
-and-
TOWN OF COLONIE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
CASE NO. C-5783 
Certification - C-5783 - 2 -
Included: See attached list of included titles. 
Excluded: All other employees including the specific titles on the attached list 
of excluded employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall • 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 26, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Roberts. Hite, Member 
Included: 
Administrative Aide (Except HR & 
Comptroller) 
Application Analyst 
Application Network Specialist 
Assessment Clerk 
Assistant Chief Water Treatment Plant 
Operator 
Assistant Golf Course Manager 
Assistant Golf Course Superintendent 
Assistant Library Director 
Assistant Recreation Maintenance Supervisor 
Building Inspector. . ,_ 
Building Maintenance Technician 
Buyer 
Chief Commercial Building Inspector 
Chief Residential Building Inspector 
Chief Sewer Treatment Plant Operator 
Chief Water Treatment Plant Operator 
Child Care Supervisor 
Civil Engineer Technician 
Clerical Aide 
Clerk to Town Justice 
Code Enforcement Officer 
Computer Network Special 
EMS Assistant Chief 
EMS Billing Clerk 
EMS Captain 
Environmental Engineer 
Environmental Services Landfill Operations 
Manager 
Evidence Clerk 
Facilities Operation Manager 
Fire Inspector 
Fire Protection Specialist 
GIS Specialist Coordinator 
Golf Course Equipment Operator 
HVAC Technician 
Information Support 
Instrumentation Technician 
Legal Secretary (Except Town Attorney) 
Library Aide 
Library Assistant 
Library Clerk 
Library Page 
Librarian I 
Librarian II 
Municipal Training Center Operator 
Network Administrator 
Paralegal (Except Town Attorney) 
Paralegal Assistant (Except Town Attorney) 
Payroll Assistant (Except Comptroller) 
Personnel Assistant (Except HR) 
Personnel Clerk (Except HR) 
Personnel Clerk/Recreation 
Planner 
Planning Aide 
Police Comm Assistant 
Principal Account Clerk 
Principal'Assessment Clerk 
Principal Clerk 
Principal Fleet Maint Clerk 
Principal Library Clerk 
Principal Police Record Clerk 
Principal Water AccoijTiTWling^Cierk 
Public Works Operating Technician 
Purchasing Clerk 
Receptionist 
Records Management Coordinator 
Real Property Appraiser 
Sanitary Engineer 
Sewer Inspector 
Sewer Maintenance Supervisor 
Sr Account Clerk Typist (Except Comptroller) 
Sr Buyer 
Sr Civil Engineer 
Sr Civil Engineering Technician 
Sr Clerk to Town Justice 
Sr Environmental Engineering Technician 
Sr Planner 
Sr Public Works Operating Technician 
Sr Real Property Appraiser 
Sr Resources Case Worker 
Sr Resources Specialist 
Sr Typist 
Sr Youth Services Specialist 
Sewer Treatment Plant Maintenance 
Supervisor 
Sewer Treatment Plant Operations 
Supervisor 
Storm Water Management Inspector 
Typist (Except Town Attorney) 
Victim Service Specialist 
Water Account Billing Clerk 
Water Chemist 
Water Construction Inspector 
Water Engineer 
Water Meter Serviceman Spvr 
Water Maintenance Supervisor 
Weigh Station Attendant 
Utility Locator 
Youth Employment Advocate 
Excluded: 
COMPTROLLER OFFICE 
Accounting Assistant 
Administrative Aide 
Accounting Supervisor 
Payroll Assistant 
Principal Accounting Assistant 
Senior Account Clerk Typist 
HUMAN RESOURCES 
Human Resources Personnel Clerk 
Personnel Clerk 
Personnel-Assistant 
Benefits Coordinator 
TOWN ATTORNEY 
Legal Secretary 
Paralegal 
Paralegal Assistant 
Typist 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, 
RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, 
ALLIED INDUSTRIAL-AND SERVICE J 
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, 
CLC, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5799 
DUNKIRK HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, -
•IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, 
Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-
CIO, CLC has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
Certification - C-5799 - 2 -
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All Office and Maintenance Employees in the following titles: 
Occupancy Specialist, Account-Clerk Typist, Tenant Service 
__. ^ Specialists pa ^ 
Maintenance Mechanic, Maintenance Mechanic, Maintenance 
Worker, Utility Worker. 
Excluded: All Managerial and Confidential Employees including the Executive 
Director. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, 
Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 26, 2008 ,> 
Albany, New York /J *~y y y ^ ^ ^ 
yy Jerome Lefk^itz/ChaMrnan 
Robert S.'Hite, Member 
